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INTRODUCTION 
Recent research (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; 
Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & vonBaeyer, 1979) concerning cognitive 
theories of depression has suggested that a person's causal attri-
butions may be associated with the presence of depression. Specific-
ally, it has been postulated that there is a "depressive attribu-
tional style" characterized by internal, stable and global attribu-
tions for bad outcomes and external, unstable and specific attribu-
tions for good outcomes. In addition, the greater incidence of 
depression in females as compared to males has been well-documented. 
Also, a number of studies have found significant differences between 
males and females in their causal attributions, with the suggestion 
that females adopt the more "depressive" pattern. 
The present study sought to review the relevant research in 
these areas in order to develop hypotheses concerning the relation-
ship among attributions, gender and depression. In general, it was 
predicted that differences in attributional style between males and 
females account for differences in the incidence of depression. 
In addition, careful examination of the results of previous 
studies suggested that using instruments to assess attribution which 
present subjects with hypothetical outcomes may weaken their power 
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to detect a significant difference in attributional style. It was 
hypothesized that attributions made to a real-life event may 
more closely reflect differences in the degree of depression than 
do hypothetical event attributions. 
These two major hypotheses were tested in an experiment in 
which subjects were asked to complete a measure of depression, a 
scale of attributional style using hypothetical outcomes and a 
questionnaire concerning attributions made to the outcome of a real-
li fe academic examination. In addition, the usefulness of weighting 
attributional variables by the importance assigned to the event was 
investigated. A multiple regression format was used to analyze 
the data and evaluate the stated hypotheses. 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In their reformulation of the learned helplessness model of 
depression, Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978) proposed an appli-
cation of attribution theory to account for several inadequacies in 
the original model. In general, the original model had proposed 
that "learning that outcomes are uncontrollable results in three 
deficits: motivational, cognitive, and emotional" (Abramson, et al., 
1978, p. SO). These three areas of deficit were seen to parallel 
the types of behavioral symptoms often observed in human depression. 
However, Abramson et al. (1978) deemed it necessary to introduce a 
causal attributional process into the sequence of cognitive events 
resulting in helplessness depressions. Specifically, they proposed 
that a person who perceives a present and past noncontingency 
between responses and outcomes experiences helplessness. The reform-
ulation "regards the attribution the individual makes for noncon-
tingency between his acts and outcomes in the here and now as a deter-
minant of his subsequent expectations for future noncontingency" 
(Abramson et al., 1978, p. 50). These attributions can be charac-
terized along three dimensions: stable-unstable, global-specific, 
and internal-external. According to the reformulation, the relative 
stability of the attribution influences the chronicity of the ex-
pectation of future helplessness. The relative globality influences 
the extent to which helplessness will be experienced in varied 
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situatio~s. Finally, the relative internality of the attribution 
should determine the extent to which self-esteem is lowered by the 
experience of helplessness. 
One of the implications of this hypothesis is that there is 
an identifiable "depressive attributional style." As stated by 
Abramson et al. (1978): 
Individual differences probably exist in attributional style. 
Those people who typically tend to attribute failure to 
global, stable and internal factors should be most prone 
to general and chronic helplessness depressions with low 
self-esteem. (p. 68) 
In a test of this assertion, Seligman, Abramson, Semmel and von 
Baeyer (1979) had college student subjects complete the Beck Depres-
sion Inventory Short Form (BDI) and the Multiple Affect Adjective 
Check List (MAACL). Subjects also completed a measure called the 
Scale of Attributional Style (SAS). This device presented subjects 
with twelve hypothetical life situations, six with good outcomes and 
six with bad outcomes. Subjects were asked to write down a major 
cause for each hypothetical outcome and then asked to rate the 
internality, stability and globality of each cause on seven-point 
4 
rating scales. Also requested was a rating of the importance of each 
event if it were to happen to the subject. This rating was also 
made on a seven-point scale. 
To analyze results, Seligman et al. (1979) computed correla-
· tions between BDI and MAACL scores and various scores on the SAS. 
Results indicated significant positive correlations between BDI and 
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MAACL scores and ratings of the internality, stability and of causes 
chosen for bad outcomes. Significant negative·correlations were 
found between BDI scores and ratings of the internality and stability 
of causes chosen for good outcomes. MAACL scores did not correlate 
significantly with SAS ratings for causes chosen for good outcomes. 
These results imply that, relative to nondepressed subjects, de-
pressed subjects attributed bad outcomes to more internal, stable 
and global causes and good outcomes to more external and unstable 
causes. These authors also calculated composite attributional 
scores by summing ratings of internality, stability and globality 
for good outcomes alone, and then for bad outcomes alone. These 
composite scores for bad outcomes correlated significantly and 
positively with BDI scores, while composite scores for good out-
comes correlated significantly and negatively with BDI scores. This 
implies that as the level of depression increased between subjects, 
the internality, stability and globality or attributions for bad 
outcomes increases, while the internality, stability and globality 
of attributions for good outcomes decreases. 
In addition, Seligman et al. (1979) felt that it would be 
informative to compare subjects scoring at the upper and lower ex-
tremes on the BDI. Upper quartile subjects (depressed, BDI_::.6) were 
significantly more internal, stable and global in their attributions 
for bad outcomes than were lower quartile subjects (nondepressed, 
BDI<l). Also, upper quartile subjects were more unstable (p <.017) 
and somewhat more external (p <.19) than lower quartile subjects 
in their attributions for good outcomes. 
The results of the Seligman et al. (1979) study suggest the 
presence of an identifiable depressive attributional style in mild 
to moderately depressed college students. However, two major areas 
of concern were not addressed in this study. Both areas have rele-
vance to the investigation of attributional bias in depression. 
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The first of these concerns an hypothesized relationship between the 
over-representation of females in depressed populations and gender 
differences in the attribution of causality. Although this issue was 
tentatively addressed in the Abramson et al. (1978) reformulation, 
the authors' thinking on this matter has never been publicly devel-
oped. Secondly, there are serious issues concerning the validity 
of the SAS-style questionnaire as a measure of attributional style 
which need to be considered. One of the chief issues is the hypo-
thetical nature of the responses generated by the SAS. There may 
be reason to believe that responses to hypothetical outcomes do not 
accurately reflect a person's actual attributional style, a point to 
be considered in detail later in this review. These two areas of 
concern will constitute the main focus of the present study. The 
remainder of this review will consider the relevant previous studies 
and develop more specific questions and hypotheses concerning these 
major issues. 
Gender and Depression 
Studies by Weissman and Klerman (1977), Winokur (1973), and 
Winokur and Morrison (1973) have documented a clear difference in 
the incidence of depression, with depression being more connnon among 
women than men. Radloff (1975) administered an extensive question-
naire to a sample of over 2,500 subjects. This questionnaire 
included questions concerning depressive symptoms and detailed 
biographical questions, including ones about possible precipitating 
factors. In general, results of this study indicated that single 
marital status and disruption in the relations.hip to the head of the 
household interacted with gender to produce a higher incidence of 
depression among women. 
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Radloff and Rae (1979) made a more detailed analysis of Rad-
loff' s (1975) data in order to determine if the difference in inci-
dence was due to differences in susceptibility or to different 
patterns of precipitating factors in men and women. They found that 
most of the simple precipitating factors associated with depression 
related similarly to the presence of depression in both men and 
women. However, when these precipitating factors were used as co-
variates with gender in an analysis of covariance, the results were 
of interest. No single covariate, or combination of covariates 
eliminated the gender differences in depression. These results imply 
that gender differences in the incidence of depression are the result 
of a greater susceptibility among women, rather than an increased 
exposure to various precipitating factors. In their discussion of 
results, Radloff and Rae (1979) suggest that "the cognitive dimension 
of depression is .•• seen as a learned susceptibility factor 
(p. 179)." 
Gender and Attributional Style 
It has frequently been proposed that the learned factor 
referred to by Radloff and Rae can, at least in part, be observed 
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in differences between males and females in their causal attribu-
tional patterns. Dweck and her associates (e.g., Dweck, 1975, 1976; 
Dweck & Bush, 1976; Dweck & Repucci, 1973) have done extensive re-
search on attributional differences with elementary school students. 
In one article, Dweck (1976) asserts that the evaluative behavior 
of elementary school teachers lays the groundwork for later attri-
butional differences. She asserts that boys are criticized more 
frequently by teachers for negative behavior in the classroom than 
are girls. However, girls are more frequently criticized by teachers 
for poor academic performance. Conversely, boys are praised when 
they show specific academic competence, while girls are praised for 
good deportment in the classroom. Dweck feels that this differ-
ential treatment of boys and girls eventually results in different 
attributions made for their academic failure and success. She 
observed that teachers attributed academic failure in boys to lack 
of effort, while academic failure in girls is attributed more often 
to lack of ability. To the extent that these early evaluative 
experiences become increasingly internalized as children proceed 
through school, they can have a potentially crucial differential 
effect on the ability of males and females to deal with failure 
experiences. Specifically, in line with the reformulation of learned 
helplessness theory, attributions to a lack of ability are poten-
tially more depressogenic than attributions to a lack of effort 
because they are generally more stable and global. While effort 
and ability are both considered to be internal factors, the state-
ment "I failed because I don't have the ability" seems to be much 
more insidious than "I failed because I didn't try hard enough." 
Dweck and Repucci (1973) had two experimenters give academic 
problems to elementary school students. The "success experimenter" 
gave solvable problems to the subjects first, followed by the "fail-
ure experimenter," who gave unsolvable problems. Then the failure 
experimenter gave subjects a set of solvable problems. Those 
children who failed these solvable problems (or who showed a marked 
decrement in performance) were those who tended to attribute failure 
to task difficulty or to lack of ability. However, males were more 
likely to attribute their failures to lack of effort than were 
females. Also, females in general were more likely to show perfor-
mance decrements in the face of previous failure. In addition, 
Dweck (l975) found that attribution retraining could alleviate the 
poor motivation reactions of children who had experienced failure. 
Specifically, re-attributing prior failure to a lack of effort 
resulted in subsequent improvements in performance. It appears that 
gender differences in attributions have their roots in the early 
achievement experiences of children and the differential attribu-
tions made by evaluative figures. 
Additional evidence concerning gender differences in attribu-
tion is found in a series of studies involving either self-attribu-
tion for performance or observers' attributions for the performance 
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of others. The self-attribution studies will be considered first. 
Crandall, Katkovsky and Preston (1962) found that there were 
gender differences in subjects' explanations of their own failures. 
First through third grade female subjects tended to internalize the 
blame for failure on an intellectual task, while males tended to 
externalize and project the blame on others. 
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Nicholls (1975) investigated attributional bias in fourth 
grade boys and girls. Subjects were given false success or failure 
feedback on an angle matching task. Attributions for task perfor-
mance were elicited by means of a movable pie graph which allowed 
subjects to make relative attributions to task ease (or difficulty), 
effort, luck or ability. Measurements were made after both practice 
and test tasks. Results for attributions on the practice task 
indicated that girls attributed failure to low ability more than 
they attributed success to high ability, while boys did not show 
this pattern. No effects for sex-of-subject were found for effort 
attributions. Boys attributed failure to bad luck more than girls 
did, and boys, but not girls, showed more bad luck attributions 
after failure than good luck attributions after success. No gender 
differences in task difficulty attributions were observed. Nicholls 
(1975) concludes that boys in general adopt defensive attributions 
when they fail (attributions to bad luck), while girls adopt self-
derogatory attributions when they fail (attributions to lack of 
ability). Nicholls stated: 
One might also express concern over boys' defensive attri-
butional bias. However, even if this defensiveness made for 
less rather than more positive achievement behavior, its 
implications would appear to be less serious than the bias 
found for girls. Girls' bias was evident for the stable 
personal dimension of ability, while boys' bias occurred only 
for the external factor of luck. (Nicholls, 1975, p. 388) 
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Halperin and Abrams (1978) had male and female college students 
rate the influence that ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck 
had on mid-term exam performance in an economics course. For 
successful students (exam grades above the median score) males and 
females used similar attributions to ability to explain their success. 
However, for unsuccessful students (exam grades below the median 
score), males tended to explain their outcomes by attributions to a 
lack of effort, while females attributed their failures to low 
ability or bad luck. Also, when making predictions for final exam 
grades, males attributed low anticipated performance on task diffi-
culty, while females tended to blame low ability for predicted poor 
performance. 
Deaux and Farris (1977) reported similar results. They 
elicited attributions for successful or unsuccessful anagram per-
formance from male and female college students. Results showed 
that men attributed their performance to ability more than females 
did, while females tended to use luck to explain their performance. 
Also, these differences were stronger in response to failure as 
opposed to success, and on masculine as opposed to feminine-typed 
tasks. 
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Breen, Vulcano and Dyck (1979) reported the results of an 
experiment in which males and females were exposed to insoluble or 
soluble anagrams in a helplessness induction procedure. One finding 
of interest was that females tended to externalize their attribu-
tions for success and internalize their attributions for failure. 
Male subjects did not demonstrate this pattern. 
Rosenfield and Stephan (1978) contend that males make more 
egotistical attributions than females. They also postulated that 
this difference is mediated by sex differences in the degree of ego-
invol vement in the task and in how well subjects expected to do on 
the task. To test these assertions, these authors had male and 
female college students participate in a geometric design matching 
task which was presented as either a masculine or a feminine task. 
False success or failure feedback was given to subjects who then 
completed an attribution questionnaire. Results indicated that males 
made more internal attributions for success and more external attri-
butions for failure on the masculine task than did females. How-
ever, on the feminine task, females attributed success more to 
internal factors and failure to external factors than did the males. 
These results, plus results of a further analysis of covariance, 
led Rosenfield and Stephan to conclude that sex differences in attri-
bution were mediated primarily by differences between males and 
females in their respective degrees of ego-involvement in the task. 
In addition, although the stable-unstable dimension was not of 
interest to these authors, analysis of reported means shows that 
females tended to attribute failure to more stable factors (ability 
and task difficulty) and success to more unstable factors (effort 
and luck) than did males. This effect seemed to be more pronounced 
for failure on the masculine task and for success on the feminine 
task. 
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Studies which assess attributions made by observers concerning 
the performance of others also demonstrate gender differences. 
Deaux and Emswiller (1974) had male and female subjects evaluate 
the performance of either a male or female stimulus person who was 
presented as being moderately successful on either a male or female-
related task. Results indicated that, for the male-related task, 
male success was attributed primarily to skill, while female success 
was attributed to chance. Also, there were no significant differ-
ences between attributions made by female and male subjects. On the 
female-related task, ratings of skill versus luck were equivalent 
for male and female stimulus persons. Results also confirmed the 
tendency for female subjects to anticipate poorer performance than 
male subjects should they attempt the sample tasks themselves. 
Feldman-Summers and Kiesler (1974) had male and female subjects 
rate the causes for identical success or failure of male or female 
stimulus figures. Results indicated that subjects attributed greater 
motivation to successful females than to successful males. In 
addition, when the stimulus person was presented as a successful 
female physician, male subjects attributed her success more to the 
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ease of the task than to other factors. Female subjects perceived 
her as having greater motivation and a harder task than a similarly 
successful male physician. These results imply that stable attribu-
tions such as high ability are used to explain success in males, 
while unstable factors such as motivation or effort are used to ex-
plain female success in identical tasks. This implies that females 
are viewed as having to try harder to succeed in order to overcome 
the handicap of lower ability. 
Feather and Simon (1975) had observer subjects rate the causal 
factors responsible for the success or failure of male and female 
actors presented as members of sex-linked occupations. Results 
indicated that subjects in general tended to view ability as a more 
important cause of male success than of female success. Conversely, 
lack of ability was viewed as a more important cause of female fail-
ure than of male failure. In addition, with regard to the sex 
linkage of occupations, Feather and Simon (1975) stated: 
When the female character succeeded at medicine, subjects 
were more likely to explain her success in terms of an 
easy course of studies, whereas an easy task was seen as a 
less important cause when the male character succeeded at 
medicine. (p. 26) 
These results again imply that people view female success as caused 
by external and unstable factors, while female failure is caused 
by internal and stable factors. 
In a related area, literature on the "self-serving biases" in 
causal attribution suggests that normal subjects adopt causal attri-
butions which reflect a motivational tendency toward self-enhancement 
following success and toward self-protection following failure 
(e.g., Luginbuhl, Crowe, & Kahan, 1975; Miller, 1976; Sobel, 1974; 
Stevens & Jones, 1976). In effect, these studies suggest that 
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normal subjects protect their self-esteem by externalizing failure 
and enhance their self-esteem by internalizing success. In a com-
prehensive review of these and other attributional studies, Zucker-
man (1979) concluded that gender differences are also found in self-
serving biases. He states that "Overall, it appears that females 
tend to make less self-serving attributions, and that this difference 
is either greater for masculine tasks or obtained only for masculine 
tasks (p. 264) • " Seen in these terms, the depressive attributional 
style proposed by Seligman et al. (1979) represents a relative lack 
of self-serving attributional bias in depressed subjects. 
In a test of this assertion, Kuiper (1978) separated female 
college students into depressed and nondepressed groups on the basis 
of their scores on the Costello-Comfrey Depression Scale. He then 
manipulated reinforcement levels for subjects as they participated 
in a bogus word association task. These levels were manipulated so 
that subjects would clearly perceive their performance as failure 
(20% "correct"). A subsequent check revealed that this manipulation 
was effective. An attribution measure was then administered to 
assess subjects' judgments concerning the contribution of ability, 
task difficulty, effort or luck to their experienced outcomes. 
Kuiper found that depressives who failed tended to make internal 
attributions, while failing nondepressives made external attributions. 
However, the prediction that depressives would make more stable 
attributions than nondepressives for failure was not upheld. 
In light of Kuiper's (1978) negative findings concerning the 
stability of attributions made by depressed females for failure, 
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and the positive finding of Rosenfield and Stephan (1978) that fe-
males tended to attribute failure to more stable factors, an impor-
tant theoretical point needs to be considered. Most of the studies 
reviewed so far have used the ability, effort, task difficulty and 
luck distinctions to define the dimensions of causal attributions. 
These distinctions have customarily been used to classify causal 
factors along two dimensions: internal-external and stable-unstable. 
The resulting 2 by 2 matrix classifies ability as an internal and 
stable factor, effort as internal and unstable, task difficulty as 
external and stable and luck as external and unstable. However, as 
pointed out by Seligman et al. (1978, Note 4), this scheme does not 
hold up. Actually, ability, effort, task difficulty and luck do not 
map directly onto orthogonal combinations of internality and stabil-
ity. For example, effort is not necessarily an unstable factor. 
An internal and stable attribution may be made to high or low abil-
ity, but may also be made to chronic laziness or consistent hard 
work. As pointed out by Zuckerman (1979), task difficulty may also 
be seen as an unstable factor by subjects with no prior experience 
with an experimental task. For these reasons, research using this 
2 by 2 matrix to classify attributions cannot lead to strong infer-
ences about the actual stability of effort and task difficulty 
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attributions. Because stability (and also globality) dimensions of 
attribution are of central importance in the depressive attributional 
style hypothesis, the present study will employ instruments which 
assess subject's specific judgments of internality, stability and 
globality of chosen attributions. This strategy is preferable to 
trying to draw inferences about attribution dimensions from the 
customary four-dimension list. It is hoped that this strategy might 
help clear up some of the conflicting results already mentioned. 
It is now possible to more explicitly state the hypotheses of 
the first segment of the present study. College student subjects 
were asked to complete the Scale of Attributional Style and the Beck 
Depression Inventory (Long Form). Two multiple regression analyses 
were performed on these data. In the first analysis, gender and 
the various attributional ratings from the SAS served as the inde-
pendent predictor variables of the level of depression as measured 
by the BDI. It was predicted that gender is a meaningful predictor 
of level of depression. More specifically, it was predicted that the 
multiple regression coefficient associated with the gender variable 
is significantly greater than zero, and that this variable accounts 
for a significant proportion of the variance in BDI scores. It was 
then determined which attributional variables, when added to the 
prediction equation along with gender, most meaningfully account for 
the variance in BDI scores. It was predicted that the coefficients 
associated with the internality, stability and globality of good 
outcomes are significantly different from zero in the negative 
direction, while the coefficients associated with the internality, 
stability and globality of bad outcomes are significantly different 
from zero in the positive direction. These variables were further 
investigated in a second multiple regression equation in which 
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gender was the dependent variable. It was expected that the coef-
ficients associated with internality, stability and globality of good 
outcomes are significantly negative while the coefficients for 
internality, stability and globality of bad outcomes are signifi-
cantly positive, given that female gender is arbitrarily assigned a 
higher value as a variable than male gender. In other words, fe-
males should demonstrate a greater tendency than males toward the 
depressive attributional style. 
Hypothetical Versus Real Attributions 
The second major focus of the present investigation concerns 
the nature of the attributional process itself. Several studies 
(~.g., Blaney, Behar & Head, 1980; Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978; 
Seligman et al., 1979) have shown that subjects do indeed endorse 
various causal attributions or dimensions of attribution when asked 
to do so. However, most of the studies which document differences 
in attribution between depressives and nondepressives for their 
failure or success have sought attributions for hypothetical events 
of varying subjective importance or for events involving false or 
manipulated performance feedback. As Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980) 
comment, "Only Barthe and Hammen (in press) have reported an attri-
butional analysis of relatively depressed and nondepressed students' 
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responses to actual examination success and failure (p. 662)." 
Obviously, there is a need for more studies which seek to investi-
gate attributional patterns when causal explanations are sought for 
real-life events. Subjects in the present study will be asked to 
complete an attributional questionnaire closely following the form 
of the hypothetical SAS after discovering their grades on their first 
examination in introductory psychology. 
This strategy has the advantage of allowing comparisons to be 
made between attributions made to hypothetical and to real-life 
events. It is possible that there are significant differences 
between these two types of attribution. The literature concerning 
this issue is relatively sparse, but there may be reason to suspect 
that attributions for real events do not reflect the same attribu-
tional patterns reported by Seligman et al. (1979) on the hypothet-
ical SAS. Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980) discuss a study reported by 
Harmnen, Krantz and Cochran (1978) in which the authors sought attri-
butions for a variety of real events such as losses and failures. 
~ey report that depressed mood is often associated with feelings 
of uncontrollability, globality and external locus of control. This 
finding runs counter to the depressive attributional style hypothesis 
that states that depressives distort attributions for failure toward 
an internal locu~ 
Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980) had depressed and nondepressed 
outpatients complete a BDI, a Life Events Inventory and an attribu-
tional questionnaire concerned with the five most stressful events 
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mentioned in the Life Events Inventory. This questionnaire sought 
information about the internality, stability and globality of causes 
mentioned, as well as their controllability, intentionality and 
expectancy. These investigators found that depressed subjects 
attributed the cause of the most upsetting event to internal, stable 
and global factors. However, no general differences between depressed 
and nondepressed subjects were found when all five events were 
compared. In addition, they found that subjects' questionnaire 
ratings of causal dimensions showed a reasonable correspondence with 
experimenter-rated causal explanations for stressful events elicited 
in the subjects' intake interviews. These results suggest that the 
patterns of attributions may be validly measured through question-
naires. However, the patterns may be quite variable among depressed 
subjects depending on the population, the nature of events under 
study and subjects' cognitions about the consequences of events. 
In an earlier study (Yount, Note 1), the present author re-
examined the results of the Seligman et al. (1979) study. To do so, 
an overall attributional style score was computed for subjects' SAS 
ratings. This score was computed as the ratio of summed ratings 
(Internality + Stability + Globality) for bad outcomes over composite 
ratings for good outcomes. Computed in this way, a score of 1.00 
represents equal ratings of causes chosen for good and bad outcomes. 
Scores greater than 1.00 represent the extent of attributional dis-
tortion toward internal, stable and global causes for bad outcomes. 
When this computation was applied to means reported by Seligman et 
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al. (1979), the results were quite interesting. The most depressed 
subjects (upper quartile of the sample, BDI Short Form scores >6) 
showed an overall attributional style score of 0.98. The least 
depressed subjects (lower quartile of the sample, BDI scores <l) 
showed an overall score of 0.78. It is clear that the two groups 
differ in the extent of attributional bias shown. However, it is 
also clear that even the most depressed subjects in the sample do not 
exhibit a particularly insidious attributional bias toward internal, 
stable and global attributions for bad outcomes. One would expect 
this group to show overall scores significantly greater than 1.00. 
This analysis implies that the truly distorted attributions for bad 
outcomes postulated as the depressive attributional style are not as 
salient as expected. It is possible that this lack of a convincing 
demonstration of real depressive attributional style is a function 
of the hypothetical nature of the outcomes presented on the SAS. It 
might be hypothesized that the depressive attributional style might 
be more identifiable when attributions are sought for real-life 
events. Certainly, real events have a much greater potential for 
ego-involvement than hypothetical events, and subjects' affective 
reactions are apt to be stronger. 
It is also possible that a different pattern of the three 
attributional dimensions is more closely associated with depression, 
as was found in the Hanunen et al. (1978) study discussed earlier. 
Also, the literature on defensive or self-serving biases in attribu-
tion does not always demonstrate consistent patterns of defensive 
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distortion. Bradley (1978) and Zuckerman (1979) both point out that 
subjects may engage in counter-defensive attributions which do not 
fit the hypothesized self-serving pattern. This tendency appears 
to be especially salient in experiments involving interpersonal 
influence, or the subjects' anticipation of future evaluation. In 
these situations, nondepressed subjects may still internalize blame 
for negative events in order to avoid hurting another subject's 
feelings or to attempt to influence future evaluations. These points 
serve to complicate the potential patterns of attribution that may 
be demonstrated by subjects. These difficulties, along with possible 
real versus hypothetical differences make it imperative to attempt 
to discover what pattern(s) are actually most closely associated 
with moderate depression. 
Another possible complication is introduced by Blaney, Behar 
and Head (1980). These authors administered the BDI (Short or Long 
Form), Krantz and Hammen's Cognitive Bias Questionnaire and Selig-
man's SAS to two different samples of college students. As was men-
tioned previously in this review, the perceived importance of the 
task, or the extent of ego-involvement may mediate the role of causal 
attributions. To investigate these possible effects, Blaney et al. 
(1980) multiplied each attributional rating on the SAS by the corres-
ponding rating of the importance of each hypothetical event. This 
manipulation has the effect of magnifying the presence of attribu-
tional bias if it exists, based en the extent of ego-involvement in 
the event. Blaney et al. (1980) report that the use of such weighted 
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scores does not increase the strength of association between depres-
sion and attribution scores. Despite these unsupportive results, 
the effect of importance weighting of scores bears further investi-
gation. The question of whether such weighting makes the hypothet-
ical events of the SAS potentially more "realistic" can also be 
addressed through comparison of real event attributions and weighted 
SAS attributions. 
In a narrow sense, the second focus of the present investiga-
tion can be construed as a test of the concurrent and construct 
validity of Seligman's SAS. Through comparison with attributions 
made by subjects for a real success or failure, the claim that the 
SAS reflects a real depressive attributional style can be more 
systematically evaluated. In a broader sense, the possibility of a 
disparity between hypothetical and real attributions will be inves-
tigated, and its relevance for cognitive theories of depression can 
be evaluated. If, as is contended by Hammen and Krantz (1979), the 
moderating effect of attributional variables is more complex than 
envisioned by Seligman et al. (1979), this complexity can be further 
understood through the results of the present study. 
To test these assertions, subjects in the present study were 
asked to make causal attributions for their success or failure on 
their first psychology examination. If subjects rated their perfor-
mance as generally poor, their real attributions were compared to 
hypothetical SAS attributions for bad outcomes. Correspondingly, 
subjects who rated their exam performance as generally good were 
compared on the basis of their hypothetical SAS attributions for 
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good outcomes. A multiple regression format was again employed. It 
was expected that attributions for real events more closely reflect 
the depressive attributional style than do attributions for hypo-
thetical events. More explicitly, attributional variables served 
as the independent predictor variables in a multiple regression 
equation with BDI scores as the dependent variable. It was predicted 
that multiple regression coefficients associated with attributions 
for real outcomes account for significantly more variance in BDI 
scores than do coefficients associated with attributions for hypo-
thetical events. 
In addition, the relative impact of weighting the attributional 
ratings from the SAS as a function of the importance ratings given 
each outcome was assessed. This was done by using weighted attri-
bution ratings as independent variables in the multiple regression 
equations generated in the gender analysis as well as the real versus 
hypothetical analysis. It was predicted that the use of the weighted 
variables adds significantly to the predictive value of using such 
variables to predict BDI scores. Specifically, it was predicted that 
coefficients associated with weighted variables are significantly 
larger in the expected directions than coefficients associated with 
unweighted variables. It should be noted that there should be 
substantial variance in importance ratings within and between sub-
jects in both segments of the present study in order for weighting 
attribution variables to contribute substantially more to the pre-
dictive value of such variables. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were drawn from a pool of undergraduate college 
students enrolled in introductory psychology courses at Loyola Uni-
versity of Chicago. The total subject pool consisted of students 
from three separate semesters of the course. During class time, 
approximately four weeks into the semester, students completed a 
battery of questionnaires which included the Scale of Attributional 
Style (SAS) and the Beck Depression Inventory (Long Form). Within 
a maximum of five days after completing the battery, subjects 
received a report of their grades on their first examination. At 
this time, they were asked to complete a separate questionnaire 
concerning their attributions for their exam performance. This 
questionnaire was called the SAS-2, and it is described below. 
Subjects were selected for the present study from the general 
subject pool through the use of a stratified sampling procedure. 
The relative proportions of males and females present in the general 
subject pool at three levels of BDI score (BDI=0-5, BDI=6-9 and 
BDI=lO or above) were first determined. Subjects were then drawn at 
random to correspond to the proportions present at the three levels. 
Only subjects with complete SAS responses were included. This 
procedure yielded a total of 266 subjects, including 89 males and 
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177 females. Data from all 266 subjects were used in the analysis 
of gender effects. A breakdown of the number and nature of subjects 
present in this sample is presented in Table 1. 
Of this total of 266 subjects, 165 subjects from only two of 
the semesters had complete data on the SAS-2 questionnaire. Of 
these 165 subjects, 54 were males and 111 were females. Only data 
from these 165 subjects were used in the hypothetical versus real 
attribution analysis. 
Instrumentation 
The Scale of Attributional Style was used to assess hypotheti-
cal attributional style. This device was introduced by Seligman 
et al. (1979). It consists of twelve hypothetical situations evenly 
divided into six situations with good outcomes and six situations 
with bad outcomes. For each situation, the subject is asked to write 
down a major cause for the outcome described. The subject is then 
asked to rate each cause on three separate seven-point scales which 
assess, respectively, the internality, stability, and globality of 
the chosen cause. Higher scale scores indicate ratings of greater 
internality, stability, and globality. In addition, the subject is 
asked to rate each situation on a seven-point scale according to how 
important the given situation would be if it were to actually happen. 
Higher importance ratings correspond to greater importance being 
given to that particular event. Copies of the SAS, including in-
structions given to subjects, are included in Appendix A. 
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Table 1 
Breakdown of Total Subjects According 
to BDI Score Levels and Gender 
Males Females 
% Within % Within 
BDI Scores N Level N Level Total Per Level 
BDI = 0-5 35 39 .8 53 60.2 88 
BDI = 6-9 25 38.5 40 61.5 65 
BDI = 10+ 29 25. 7 84 74.3 113 
TOTALS 89 33.5 177 66.5 266 
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Psychometric data concerning the SAS form used are discussed 
in Note 1 of Seligman et al. (1979). Reliability coefficient alphas 
for the various subscales are reported as follows: bad outcome 
internality = .44, good outcome internality = .39, bad outcome 
stability = .63, good outcome stability = .58, bad outcome globality 
= .64, and good outcome globality = .58. While these reliabilities 
might be considered low, Seligman et al. report robust results for 
differences in attributional style between depressed and nondepressed 
college students. In addition, these authors report significant 
(p <.001) correlations with the Beck Depression Inventory, Short 
Form as follows: bad outcome internality: r = .41; bad outcome 
globality: r = .35; bad outcome stability: r = .34. Also reported 
are: good outcome internality: r = .22 (p <.01); good outcome sta-
bility: r = -.28 (p <.002), and good outcome globality: r = -.04 
(non-significant). 
Also used was an adaptation of the SAS called here the SAS-2. 
Tiiis device was used in order to gather attribution information con-
cerning subjects' causal explanations for their real exam performance. 
Two questions were asked concerning 1) the letter grade received by 
the subject and 2) his or her subjective evaluation of the grade 
received in terms of his or her personal standards. Tiiis latter 
question asked subjects to rate their evaluation on a seven-point 
scale from "Excellent" (rating= 7) to "Terrible" (rating= 1). 
Subjects were then asked to write down a major cause for their per-
formance, followed by ratings of the internality, stability and 
globality of the chosen cause. These were seven-point scales which 
correspond exactly to the form of the SAS. Subjects were then 
30 
asked to rate the importance of their specific exam performance and 
the importance of their general academic performance. Again, higher 
ratings on the SAS-2 correspond to greater internality, stability, 
globality,and importance ratings. A copy of the SAS-2 is contained 
in Appendix A. 
RESULTS 
Gender and Attributional Style 
In order to evaluate the stated hypotheses concerning gender 
and attributional style, a standard multiple regression analysis 
was performed. In this analysis, BDI scores served as the dependent 
variable, and gender and the various attributional dimensions from 
the SAS scores served as the independent predictor variables. 
Results of this analysis are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 
presents the results of the overall test of goodness of fit of the 
multiple regression equation. This test evaluates the null hypoth-
esis that the multiple correlation of gender and SAS variables with 
BDI scores is zero. Results indicate that the null hypothesis is 
rejected, F(7,258) = 3.04, p <.01, implying that the overall multiple 
correlation is significantly different from zero. This overall 
multiple correlation coefficient is equal to 0.276, which, when 
squared, implies that the combination of gender and SAS variables 
accounts for 7.6% of the total variance in BDI scores. 
To evaluate the relative contribution of individual predictor 
variables to the variance explained by the total equation, a series 
of F tests were then performed. Results of these tests are presented 
in Table 3. Because the contribution of the gender variable is of 
primary interest, initial attention will be focused on the F test 
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Table 2 
Analysis of Variance Summary for Overall Multiple Regression 
Equation with BDI Scores Dependent and Unweighted 
Attributional Variables and Gender as Predictors 
Source Sum of Squares Mean Square df F 
Multiple 
Regression 
Equation 1032.49 147.50 7 3.04 <.01 
Residual 12524.86 48.55 258 
Overall Multiple R = 0.276. R Square = 0.076 
Table 3 
Summary of the Multiple Regression Analysis of Gender and Attributional Variables 
Variable 
Positive Outcome 
Stability 
Negative Outcome 
Globality 
Negative Outcome 
Stability 
Gender 
Normative Outcome 
Internality 
Positjve Outcome 
Internality 
Positive Outcome 
Globality 
with BDI Scores Dependent (Unweighted Attribution Variables) 
~ultiple R 
0.138 
0.208 
0.244 
0.272 
0.275 
0.276 
0.276 
·, 
l 
'.. ~ · ... / 
' 
' \., 
"-,,.., 
R Squared 
0.019 
0.043 
0.060 
0.074 
0.076 
0.076 
0.076 
,.. ..... ,. -
.1.,, 
.. ..,.,. ,"'• ' ,.l'j· 
:V'J 
./ 
l 
'"i ,;$""' 
, 
' ? 
.-l 
F 
(df =-1,258) 
4. 34 
9.23 
4.61 
3.53 
0.47 
0.14 
0.06 
E. 
<.05 
<.01 
<.05 
<.10 
N.S. 
N.S. 
N.S. 
Simple R 
-0.14 
0.12 
-0.08 
0.11 
0.07 
-0.07 
-0.03 
w 
w 
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for this variable. Results for the gender variable indicate that 
F(l,258) = 3.53, p <.10. This result approaches, but does not reach, 
statistical significance. From Table 3, it can be observed that 
the increment in the multiple R squared associated with the gender 
variable is 0.014, implying that gender accounts for only 1.4% of 
the total variance in BDI scores when the contribution of SAS var-
iables is accounted for. In addition, an examination of means 
reported in Table 4 shows that the mean BDI score for males is 7.99, 
while for females it is 9.63. Standard t-test results show that 
this difference is significant, t264 = 1.77, p <.05, one tailed. 
These results confirm the hypothesis that females are generally more 
depress.ed. However, this difference is apparently not large enough 
to make gender a significant predictor of overall variance in BDI 
scores. 
Another hypothesis tested concerns the usefulness of using 
weighted attribution variables as predictors of BDI scores along 
with the gender variable. In the present study, weighted attribu-
tion variables were calculated by multiplying ratings of the inter-
nality, stability and globality of chosen causes for each SAS outcome 
by the corresponding rating of the importance of each outcome and 
then summing these products across the six positive and the six 
negative outcome situations. Descriptive statistics for the resul-
tant weighted variables for males and females are presented in Table 
4. 
35 
Table 4 
Sunnnary Statistics for Males vs. Females 
on BDI and Attributional (SAS) Scores 
Variable Males (N=89) Females (N=l77) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
BDI 7.99 7.62 9.63 6.86 
UNWEIGHTED VARIABLES 
Positive Outcomes 
Internality 27.24 4.32 26.81 3.98 
Stability 32.21 4.52 33.11 5.09 
Globality 29.67 4.54 30.37 5.40 
Negative Outcomes 
Internality 25. 77 6. 75 26.59 5.29 
Stability 27.98 5.63 27.66 5.68 
Globality 25.16 6.34 24.99 6.36 
WEIGHTED VARIABLES 
Positive Outcomes 
Internality 147.11 31.94 152.10 31. 97 
Stability 177. 48 40.87 189.41 39.65 
Globality 164.38 39. 72 176.24 40. 77 
Negative Outcomes 
Internality 130. 91 45.39 143.18 36.69 
Stability 143.24 42. 71 147.88 39.90 
Globality 128.81 44.43 134.55 43.50 
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To investigate the impact of using such weighted variables, a 
second multiple regression equation analysis was performed, with 
gender and weighted SAS variables used as independent predictors with 
BDI scores dependent. Table 5 presents the summary of the test for 
goodness of fit for this regression equation, F(6,259) = 2.93, p <.01, 
implying that the overall multiple correlation with weighted SAS 
variables is also significantly different from zero. This multiple 
regression equation generated an overall multiple coefficient of 
0.252, which implies that the use of weighted variables along with 
gender accounts for 6.4% of the total variance in BDI scores. Since 
the use of unweighted variables accounts for 7.6% of the variance in 
BDI scores, it can be concluded that the use of weighted variables 
does not add significantly to the predictive power of attribution 
variables. 
Another hypothesis to be evaluated concerns the attribution 
variables which significantly account for variance in BDI scores. 
Results for unweighted variables are presented in Table 3. In addi-
tion to gender, three attribution variables have multiple regression 
coefficients significantly different from zero: Positive outcome 
stability, F(l,258) = 4.34, p <.05, Negative outcome globality, 
F(l,258) = 9.23, p <.01 and Negative outcome stability, F(l,258) = 
4.61, p <.05. Results of F tests for other attribution variables are 
not significant. The signs and magnitudes of the simple regression 
coefficients associated with the significant variables are as 
follows: Positive outcome stability simple r = -0.14, Negative 
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Table 5 
Analysis of Variance Summary for Overall Multiple Regression 
Equation with BDI Scores Dependent, and Weighted 
Attributional Variables and Gender as Predictors 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares df Square F 
.E. 
Multiple Regression 
Equation 863. 31 6 143.88 2.93 <.01 
Residual 12694.03 259 49.01 
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outcome globality simple r = +o.12 and Negative outcome stability 
simple r = -0.08. These results imply that Positive outcome sta-
bility and Negative outcome stability ratings decrease as BDI scores 
increase. Negative outcome globality ratings increase as BDI scores 
increase. These results confirm the hypotheses of the present study 
for Positive outcome stability and Negative outcome globality 
because the relationship with BDI scores is significant and in the 
expected direction. Results for Negative outcome stability ratings 
are in the opposite direction than that hypothesized. 
Results of a similar multiple regression analysis using 
weighted SAS variables are summarized in Table 6. With weighted 
variables, only the relationship between Negative outcome globality 
and BDI scores is significant and in the expected direction, F(l, 
258) = 8.70, p <.01, simpler= +o.13. 
In order to further probe the relationship between gender and 
attributional variables, further multiple regression analyses were 
performed with gender as the dependent variable and both weighted 
and unweighted SAS variables as independent predictors. Results of 
the analysis for unweighted variables are summarized in Table 7. 
Results indicate that it cannot be stated that there is a significant 
non-zero overall multiple regression coefficient, F(6,259) = 1.45, 
n.s. Results of a similar analysis using weighted SAS variables as 
independent predictors are summarized in Tables 8 and 9. These 
results imply that the overall multiple regression coefficient of 
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Table 6 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis of Gender 
and Attributional Variables as Predictors with BDI 
Scores Dependent (Weighted Attribution Variables) 
Variable Multiple R R Squared F 
.E. Simple R (df=f:-258) 
Negative Outcome 
Globality 0.126 0.016 8.70 <.01 0.13 
Negative Outcome 
Stability 0.195 0.038 4.76 <.05 0.00 
Gender 0.220 0.049 2.90 <.10 0.11 
Positive Outcome 
Stability 0.237 0.056 2.17 N.S. -0.05 
Negative Outcome 
Intemality 0.248 0.062 1.23 N.S. 0.11 
Positive Outcome 
Internality 0.252 0.064 0.54 N .S. -0.01 
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Table 7 
Analysis of Variance Summary for Overall Multiple Regression 
Analysis with Gender Dependent and Attributional Variables 
as Predictors (Unweighted Attribution Variables) 
Sum of 
Source Squares df Mean Square F 
Multiple Regression 
Equation 1.927 6 0.321 1.45 (N .S.) 
Residual 57.295 259 0.221 
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Table 8 
Analysis of Variance Summary for Overall Multiple Regression 
Analysis with Gender Dependent and Weighted 
Attributional Variables as Predictors 
Sum of 
Source Squares df Mean Square F 
.E. 
Multiple Regression 
Equation 2.814 6 0.469 2.15 <.05 
Residual 56.408 259 0.218 
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Table 9 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis of 
Weighted Attributional Variables with Gender Dependent 
Variable Multiple R R Squared F Simple R 
(df=l, 259) 
Negative Outcome 
Internality 0.144 0.021 6.45 <.05 0.144 
Positive Outcome 
Globality 0.184 0.034 1.09 N.S. 0.138 
Negative Outcome 
Stability 0.197 0.039 0.96 N.S. 0.054 
Positive Outcome 
Stability 0.206 0.042 1. 70 N.S. 0.140 
Positive Outcome 
Internality 0.216 0.047 1.31 N. S. 0.074 
Negative Outcome 
Globality 0.218 0.048 0.24 N .S. 0.062 
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0.218 is significantly different from zero, and accounts for 4.8% 
of the total variance in gender. When the impact of the individual 
weighted SAS predictor variables is assessed (Table 9), only Nega-
tive outcome internality, F(l,259) = 6.45, p <.05, simple r = +o.14, 
proves to be significantly related to gender. Because female gender 
was arbitrarily assigned a higher variable value than male gender, 
this result implies that weighted Negative outcome internality 
ratings are higher for females than for males. This relationship is 
in the expected direction. All other weighted and unweighted SAS 
variables cannot be said to be significantly related to gender. 
To summarize these rather complicated and varied results, it 
can be said that the general hypothesis concerning the relation 
between gender and depression is supported only by statistical trends. 
The use of weighted SAS variables does not appear to add to the 
predictive value of such variables. The only unweighted SAS var-
iables which relate significantly to depression in the expected 
direction are Positive outcome stability and Negative outcome global-
ity, while Negative outcome stability relates to depression in the 
opposite direction than was expected. The only weighted SAS variable 
significantly related to depression in the expected direction is 
Negative outcome globality. The only SAS variable which relates 
significantly to gender in the expected direction is weighted 
Negative outcome internality. 
Real Versus Hypothetical Attributions 
As mentioned previously, a subset of 165 out of the 266 total 
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subjects was used to analyze possible differences between real and 
hypothetical outcome attributions. Subjects were assigned to either 
a positive outcome or a negative outcome group based on their SAS-2 
responses concerning their subjective evaluation of their exam per-
formance. Subjects evaluating their exam performance as "Terrible" 
to "Poor" (Ratings = 1 to 3, respectively) were assigned to the 
negative outcome group. Their ratings of internality, stability 
and globality of causes chosen for exam performance were designated 
as attribution ratings for a negative real outcome in order to be 
compared to their hypothetical outcome ratings for negative outcomes. 
Subjects evaluating their exam performance as "Fair" to "Excellent" 
(Ratings= 4 to 7, respectively) were designated as experiencing a 
positive outcome, and SAS-2 ratings were only compared with SAS 
ratings of causes chosen for hypothetical positive outcomes. Summary 
statistics for these positive and negative groups are presented in 
Table 10. 
In order to analyze possible differences between hypothetical 
and real outcome attributions, a series of hierarchical multiple 
regression equations were generated. This type of multiple regres-
sion analysis differs from the type used in the first section of the 
present study in that variables are now added into the equations in 
a specified order. This strategy allows F tests to be performed to 
determine if either of the hypothetical or real attribution variable 
groups (internality+stability+globality ratings) contributes signi-
ficantly more to the explained variance in BDI scores when added last 
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Table 10 
Summary Statistics for Real and Hypothetical Attribution Variables 
for Subjects Experiencing Positive or Negative Exam Outcomes 
EXAM 
Outcome 
Positive (N=96) Negative (N=69) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Subjective 
Evaluation 5.04 1.07 2.04 0.92 
Hypothetical 
Attributions (SAS) 
Internality 4.54 0.60 4.43 1.02 
Stability 5.59 0.69 4.46 1.07 
Globality 5.19 o. 77 4.03 1.29 
Real Outcome 
Attributions (SAS-2) 
Internality 5. 71 1.35 5.61 1.65 
Stability 5.69 1.33 4. 75 1.98 
Globality 4.53 1.89 3. 77 1. 78 
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to the equation. It should be noted that since a subject's subjec-
tive evaluation of his or her exam performance may be confounded by 
the presence or absence of depression, the subjective evaluation 
variable is allowed to enter the multiple regression equation first. 
This strategy in effect allows the proportion of explained variance 
in BDI scores attributable to this confounded variable to be removed 
from the consideration of the relative explanatory power of hypothet-
ical and real attribution variables. 
Results of the F tests applied to the proportions of explained 
variance attributable to hypothetical of real outcome attributions 
are summarized in Table 11. As can be observed, none of these F 
tests reaches significance. These results imply that neither real 
nor hypothetical outcome attributions add significantly more to the 
explained variance than the other when added last to the hierarchi-
cal equation. Thus, the hypothesis concerning the supposed predom-
inance of real outcome attributions in accounting for level of 
depression was not confirmed. This effect is most likely the result 
of the relatively weak predictive value of all attribution variables, 
since the multiple Regression coefficient R equals only 0.27 for 
negative outcome subjects and only 0.26 for the positive outcome 
group. This means that only 7.1% of the variance in BDI scores is 
explained by all the variables considered. Inferences concerning 
the relative contribution of variable subsets to this relatively 
small proportion of explained variance must, of necessity, be quite 
tentative. 
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Table 11 
Summary of F Tests When Hypothetical or Real Attribution 
Variables Are Added Last In a Hierarchical Multiple 
Regression Analysis (N = 165)(BDI Scores Dependent) 
Negative Exam Outcome 
Total R (df=3,157) 
Variable Squared Change F £. 
Subjective Evaluation .022 
--* --* 
Real Attributions .011 0.67 N.S • 
Hypothetical Attributions • 035 2.00 N.S. 
Multiple R = 0.27 R2 = 0.071 
Positive Exam Outcome 
Total R (df=3, 157) 
Variable Squared Change F E. 
Subjective Evaluation .022 
Real Attributions . 019 0.67 N.S • 
Hypothetical Attributions . 027 1. 78 N.S . 
Multiple R = 0.26 R2 = 0.071 
*Note: See text for explanation of F-test procedures 
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Also evaluated were hypotheses concerning the effects of 
weighting real outcome attribution variables by multiplying attri-
bution ratings by the importance ratings elicited by the SAS-2. 
However, there was very little variance in importance ratings across 
subjects. For positive outcome subjects, the mean importance rating 
for exam performance was 6.33 (out of a possible 7 as "Extremely 
Important"), with variance equal to 0.58. For negative outcome 
subjects, the mean was also 6.33, with variance of 1.37. Since the 
variance of real outcome importance ratings is so small, the effects 
of weighting real outcome attribution variables are not likely to 
produce significant differences from the use of unweighted variables. 
For this reason, the hypothesis that weighting real outcome attri-
bution variables might increase their explanatory power was not 
confirmed. 
DISCUSSION 
The basic premise surrounding the hypotheses generated in the 
first major segment of this study is that gender differences in the 
incidence and extent of depression can be accounted for by differ-
ences between males and females in their causal attributions. Al-
though results do indicate a significant difference in depression 
scores between males and females in the expected direction, the 
basic hypothesis is supported only by statistical trends and mixed 
results. In general, significant differences in attributional style 
were not found between males and females, except in a few rather 
specific cases. Indeed, the combination of attribution variables 
and the gender variable used as predictors of BDI scores only 
accounts for 7.6% of the total variance in BDI scores. It is obvious 
that factors not measured in the present study are responsible for 
a large portion of the variance in depression scores between subjects. 
It must also be concluded that, at least for the present sample, 
differences in causal attribution do not strongly account for differ-
ences in the degree of depression. 
However, in the context of these generally weak relationships 
between gender, attributional style and depression, some relatively 
minor trends found in the data may provide footholds for speculation 
and further inquiry. For example, in the overall regression equation 
with BDI scores dependent, three unweighted SAS attribution variables 
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account for small but statistically significant portions of total 
BDI variance. Both positive outcome stability and negative outcome 
stability ratings correlate significantly with BDI scores in the 
negative direction, implying that such ratings decrease as BDI scores 
increase. In terms of the actual wording of the SAS stability ques-
tions, this result means that the more depressed subjects believed 
that the causes chosen for both positive and negative outcomes 
would, relatively, not influence the outcome of similar situations. 
Seligman's reformulation of learned helplessness predicts that the 
more depressed subjects tend to view the causes of positive outcomes 
as unstable, which translates into an expectation that the causes of 
positive outcomes will not operate in similar situations in the 
future. The results of the present study tend to confirm this 
assertion. 
However, Seligman's theory does not predict that the more de-
pressed subjects will also rate the causes of negative outcomes as 
relatively unstable. According to the reformulation, the more de-
pressed subjects should believe that the causes of bad outcomes will 
also influence the bad outcomes of similar situations in the future. 
The depressed subjects in the present study appear to believe more 
strongly than the nondepressed subjects that causes chosen for bad 
outcomes are not as likely to operate in the future, a result which 
conflicts with the reformulation. 
There are several possible interpretations of this result. It 
is possible that the general belief in the instability of causes 
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represents a roore general pessimism on the part of depressed sub-
jects. However, this pessimism may not represent the simple expec-
tation that future events will have bad outcomes. Rather, this 
pessimism may be of a more specific and subtle type. It must be 
remembered that the context of subjects' attribution ratings pertains 
to causes for certain outcomes. Seen in this way, the instability 
of causes for positive or negative outcomes may represent the belief 
that each new situation is unique, and that each new situation has 
its own unique pattern of causes. It is as if the depressed subject 
is saying, "I can't be sure that any causal explanation of my present 
outcomes will apply in the future." This posture implies that future 
events are unpredictable. Seen in this way, the depressive subject 
is in a chronic state of doubt about the outcome of future events. 
He or she shys away from making any sort of prediction because the 
causes of past events, either positive or negative, are seen as 
unstable. It is true that this doubt might be transformed into the 
hope that causes for negative events will not operate in the future. 
However, this rather tentative hopefulness occurs along with the 
belief that causes for past positive events will not operate in the 
future either. The distinction here is between a pessimism of causes 
as opposed to a pessimism of events. 
This distinction may be extended as a possible explanation of 
the difference in the nature of the pessimism expressed by the more 
seriously depressed person as opposed to that expressed by the person 
who is only mildly depressed. It seems likely that the seriously 
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depressed person is more pessimistic about events. He or she expects 
things to turn out badly in the future. The less seriously depressed 
person, on the other hand, may have a chronic pessimism about causes. 
He or she may not feel that the future is necessarily bleak, but 
merely that the future is unpredictable. Positive events might take 
place, but the causes for past positive events may not apply. In 
clinical training, the present author has encountered a number of 
mildly depressed older adolescents. These people often communicate 
the attitude that the world is a generally uncertain place. They 
find it difficult to make positive or negative statements about 
specific events in the future because they are not sure that the 
causes of past good or bad outcomes will again operate. They appear 
to lack a stable basis for prediction. The subjects in the present 
study seem to exhibit a tendency toward this same pessimism of 
causes. 
It may be possible to reconcile this concept with some of the 
more basic ideas proposed by Seligman's reformulation. In the 
Abramson et al. (1978) article, a causal sequence leading to the 
symptoms of helplessness depressions is proposed. In this sequence, 
people perceive a noncontingency between responses and outcomes in 
the present and past, and make attributions for this noncontingency. 
These attributions, in turn, lead to the expectation of future non-
contingency. This concept of the expectation of future noncontingency 
is quite similar to what is being called here the pessimism of causes. 
The lack of any predictable relationship between responses and 
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outcomes in the future can take place in the context of unstable 
causes. When the person is uncertain about the causes of past and 
present outcomes, he or she cannot be sure that certain responses 
will be reliably followed by certain outcomes in the future. It is, 
of course, possible that this uncertainty is greater when the person 
assumes that there are external causes than it would be if internal 
causes are blamed. However, even internal attributions for outcomes 
can•contribute to uncertainty about the future if these attributions 
are also seen as unstable. It is also still possible that internal 
and stable attributions for past negative outcomes will lead to the 
expectation of future negative outcomes. However, it is proposed 
that this latter attributional pattern is more characteristic of the 
pessimism of events associated with more severe depression. The 
pessimism of causes may be associated more with moderate depression. 
It is proposed that moderate depression may be associated with a 
greater variety of attributional patterns than is proposed by Selig-
man's reformulation. Given this new point of view, the instability 
of causes becomes an important factor in producing mild depression, 
regardless of the internal-external dimension or the positive or 
negative nature of the experienced outcome. 
This speculation is supported by the discussion presented by 
Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980). They state: 
. • • it is time for more differentiated and elaborated models 
of depression and cognition. The present study, as well as the 
recent ones noted, suggests that different patterns of attribu-
tions may be associated with depression, depending on the 
population sampled or the nature of the events studied. . • 
Depression may be most likely to occur when the coping or self-
efficacy perceptions are most bleak for the individual, but 
such perceptions may not always be directly predictable from 
knowledge of causal attributions. • • • Our studies lead to 
tentative conclusions that there are various cognitive pathways 
to depression • (pp. 667-668) 
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It is proposed that the bleakness of coping or self-efficacy percep-
tions can be greatly exacerbated by the instability of causes for 
both positive and negative outcomes. 
The other attribution variable which tended to be associated 
with greater depression in the present study was unweighted negative 
outcome globality. This variable correlated positively with BDI 
scores, implying that the globality of causes chosen for bad outcomes 
increases as depression increases. In more basic terms, depressed 
subjects seem to believe that causes for particular negative events 
will also influence other events in their lives. This result is 
consistent with the results presented by Blaney et al. (1980), who 
found the correlation between SAS unweighted bad outcome globality 
and BDI scores to be the most robust of all the attribution-depression 
score correlations. When combined with the present study's findings 
of a general instability of causes for both positive and negative 
outcomes, bad outcome globality takes on a special meaning. While 
depressed subjects cannot be sure that causes for certain events will 
operate in similar situations in the future, they appear to be more 
certain that the causes of negative events will influence other 
areas of their lives in the future. The person who says that he or 
she failed at a task because he or she is generally lazy may not be 
be certain that laziness will influence that task in the future. 
However, he or she can be more certain that laziness will crop up 
during other types of tasks. In this way, the pessimism of causes 
may be somewhat relieved, but uncertainty is reduced only through 
the assumption that other areas of life may fall prey to globally 
negative factors. While uncertainty is reduced, depression and 
general pessimism can only be increased through such a combination 
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of causal assumptions. This more interactional approach to the re-
lationship between causal attributions obviously makes this relation-
ship a great deal more complicated than the Seligman reformulation 
would suggest. 
Since this more complicated relationship is suggested by 
trends found in the present study, a further theoretical and methodo-
logical point must be considered. As stated by Blaney et al. (1980), 
II it is clear that internality, stability and globality may in-
teract with one another in important ways not captured by considering 
them one at a time or in a simple sum" (p. 682). And, as pointed 
out by Huesmann (1978), "Any reformulated model of depression should 
include a more careful delineation of the types of depression being 
explained" (p. 195). Given these two points of view, the results of 
the present study suggest that an unspecified number of attributional 
patterns could be associated with different types and levels of 
depression. If this were true, the lack of a statistically strong 
relationship between a single hypothesized pattern of attributions 
arrd relatively moderate reported depression in college students in 
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the present study is not too surprising. The design and analyses 
used in the present study are admittedly not precise or comprehensive 
enough to account for BDI score variance which may result from more 
complicated interactions of attributional dimensions. Future research 
should incorporate more precise hypotheses and design techniques to 
test for ltDre varied attributional patterns. 
The results of the analysis of gender effects and attributional 
style do not generally confirm the hypotheses of the present study. 
In the context of the above discussion, there is no reason to be-
lieve that separating gender effects would lead to any further sim-
plification of the attributional model. If complicated interactions 
can take place between attributional dimensions to produce depression, 
the results of the present study suggest that such interactions 
could take place in males as well as females. In addition, the 
general differences in attributional style between males and females 
reported in previous studies do not appear in the results of the 
present study, with the exception of one special case to be considered 
shortly. Two major factors might account for this lack of significant 
differences between males and females. 
The first of these possible factors is advanced tentatively, 
and is obviously in need of further investigation. It is possible, 
however, that attributional patterns demonstrated by females in the 
past studies have changed in the ensuing years. It is possible that 
today's female college students have shifted away from the depressive 
attributional style toward a style which is more self-serving. In 
terms of attributions made for bad outcomes, the present sample of 
females may adopt less internal, stable and global attributions than 
previous samples. We may be observing the cognitive results of some 
fairly significant changes in the definition of women's roles in 
society and in the factors to which they attribute their successes 
and failures in a wide variety of tasks. 
As Deaux and Farris (1977) have observed, "most of the signi-
ficant differences between men and women occur on the masculine 
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task. • • Differences between men and women also seem more apparent 
in the case of failure as opposed to success" (p. 69). It is possible 
that the distinction between "masculine" and "feminine" tasks has 
blurred considerably, especially in younger college-age populations. 
When the types of situations presented in the SAS are considered in 
this light, none of them can be clearly labeled as masculine or fem-
inine tasks. It is not surprising, then, to find that attributions 
elicited from the SAS do not differ substantially between males and 
females. Further research might possibly substantiate these tenta-
tive claims by comparing women of different ages, and also by compar-
ing college-student females with females of the same age in the 
general population. 
The second major factor to be considered also has to do with 
the nature of the tasks presented on the SAS. These tasks can be 
separated into two distinct types: affiliation situations and 
achievement situations. Most of the studies considered in the review 
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of the literature for this study demonstrated male and female differ-
ences in attributions for achievement-type tasks. In a previous 
study by the present author (Yount, Note 1), it was found that sub-
jects with nondepressive attributional styles for affiliation outcomes 
became more elated following a success than did those subjects with 
depressive affiliation outcome styles. This difference was not 
demonstrated for styles associated with achievement-type outcomes. 
In the light of these differing results for the two types of outcomes, 
it is possible that actual male and female differences are confounded 
in the present sample. Actual differences between males and females 
on one type of task may have been cancelled out by differences in 
the opposite direction on the other type of task. For example, the 
depressive attributional style may be more salient for females than 
for males on achievement tasks, consistent with previous results. 
However, the depressive style may be more salient in males on affili-
ation tasks. Thus, what appears to be an equivalence between males 
and females in the present sample may actually represent opposing 
differences based on the type of task involved. Future attempts to 
demonstrate attributional differences with the SAS should take this 
point into consideration. 
One potentially meaningful difference between the attributions 
made by males and females was found. When weighted SAS variables 
were used as predictors with gender dependent, negative outcome 
internality was found to account for a small but statistically sig-
nificant portion of the variance in gender. The direction of this 
relationship implies that females adopted more internal attributions 
for bad outcomes than did males, a result which confirms the stated 
hypothesis. However, this is true for weighted attributions of 
internality. It must be remembered that weighted ratings were ob-
tained by multiplying attribution ratings for a particular outcome 
by the importance rating for that outcome for each subject. Since 
negative outcome internality ratings did not differ between males 
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and females for unweighted ratings, some aspect of the weighting 
process is implicated. To have produced this difference, it is most 
likely that females rated situations with negative outcomes as being 
more important than did males. Further statistical probing of this 
interaction between importance, outcome and gender is not possible 
given the present design, so we can only speculate about the source 
of the difference. It is possible that this difference may represent 
a greater sensitivity to failure among females in the sample. Given 
the pressures in today's society for females to demonstrate compe-
tence in situations and roles previously considered the province of 
males, it is not surprising that females might place more importance 
on failure. Becoming ego-involved in difficult situations with the 
potential for failure may represent an adaptive way to better one's 
performance on such tasks. However, consistent with the hypotheses 
of this study, overemphasizing the importance of situations with a 
negative outcome may also be potentially depressing. 
The general lack of significant differences between the pre-
dictive power of weighted versus unweighted attributions is consistent 
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with the findings of Blaney et al. (1980). These researchers con-
cluded that " •.• there was no indication that such weighting in-
creased the association with level of depression" (p. 680). However. 
in the light of Rosenfield and Stephan's (1978) contention that ego-
involvement mediates male and female differences in attributions, 
these results are somewhat puzzling. It may be possible that SAS 
importance ratings mediate the association between attribution, 
gender and depression in a more complicated fashion than a simple 
multiplicative manipulation would reveal. It is also possible that 
meaningful differences between weighted and unweighted variables are 
washed out through the complicated interactions of outcome and out-
come type mentioned previously. The investigation of such possi-
bilities may be fertile ground for more empirical research on the 
mathematical impact of importance ratings as a measure of ego-involve-
ment. 
In the second major portion of the present study, possible 
differences between attributions made to hypothetical versus real 
events were investigated. Results indicated that real event attri-
butions are not significantly better predictors of level of depression 
than hypothetical event attributions. One possible reason for this 
lack of differences may be found in a factor already mentioned. 
The SAS is divided into achievement and affiliation situations, while 
the SAS-2 used here to assess real outcome attributions pertains 
strictly to an achievement situation (exam performance). Perhaps if 
SAS-2 responses had been compared only with SAS achievement-related 
outcome responses, the expected differences would have emerged. 
Another possible interpretation has also already been touched 
on. Perhaps neither hypothetical E.£E_ real attributions can be so 
simply related to the presence of depression. It is speculated that 
the possible relationships among attributions and depression are so 
complicated by the possibility of multiple attributional patterns 
that the relatively straightforward assessment of attributions with 
SAS-type devices, and their analysis with correlational designs just 
does not give a full enough picture. It would not be inconsistent 
with the speculations already presented to assume that the same com-
plications which apply to hypothetical attributions might also apply 
to real attributions. 
One other point needs to be considered also. The present 
design sought to show relationships between attributional patterns 
and the presence of depression. This point of view may be too 
narrow. Perhaps attributional style, either real or hypothetical, 
predisposes people to depression. It is obvious that the BDI seeks 
to assess the presence of and not the predisposition to depression. 
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As Blaney et al. (1980) put it: II . a strong relationship between 
cognitive distortion and depression vulnerability would not necessar-
ily result in a strong correlation between distortion and depression" 
(p. 682, italics theirs). Depression, especially mild or moderate 
depression is also a generally fluctuating phenomenon. The possibil-
ity exists that some subjects in the present sample who had 
particularly depressive attributional styles did not endorse many 
BDI items because they were feeling better on that day. The cumula-
tive effect would again be to wash out possible significant differ-
ences between subjects for both real and hypothetical attributions. 
On another level, it is possible that the assessment of attri-
butions with SAS-type questionnaires does not give full credit to 
the complexity of the attributional process as a whole. As Wortman 
and Dintzer (1978) mention, the attributional process may more clearly 
be viewed as an hypothesis-testing procedure. In this sense, causal 
attributions represent tentative and unstable guesses about causes 
which are then tested against future experiences. Seen in this way, 
SAS-type assessments only give us a look at variable stages of a 
dynamic process. This point of view is in some considerable conflict 
with the conception of the SAS as a measure of some concrete and 
stable feature of a person's cognitive life. Any research design 
which only samples a single temporal slice of fluctuating depression 
and ever-changing attributional hypotheses must necessarily be greatly 
weakened. 
In addition, the process of developing causal attributions 
may be influenced by a variety of factors not measured in the present 
study. As Huesman (1978) implies, a one-time assessment of causal 
attributions does not take into account the various information-
process ing and expectancy judgment strategies engaged in by different 
people. In this sense, we must not only examine the causal attribu-
tions endorsed by subjects, but we must also examine the possible 
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distortions of information which can lead to variability in the for-
mation of tentative attributions. SAS-type instruments simply cannot 
do this. Also, the possibility that the presence of depression may 
itself influence the endorsement of attributions cannot be accounted 
for by the SAS. 
In summary, it can be said that the lack of confirming results 
in the present study is most likely the result of taking too narrow 
a look at a relatively complicated phenomenon. The possibility of 
multiple attributional patterns associated with depression, as well 
as the inadequacies of SAS-type assessment devices used in a correla-
tional design make it difficult to demonstrate meaningful and signi-
ficant differences in gender and attributional style. Further re-
search should focus on the attempt to investigate these more compli-
cated phenomena. Among these phenomena are the possible distinction 
between a pessimism of causes as opposed to a pessimism of events, 
possible historical changes in gender-specific attribution patterns, 
the fluctuating nature of moderate depression, and differences in the 
nature of mild versus severe depression. Also to be investigated 
are the more basic aspects of the attribution process itself. More 
precise and testable models, and the use of longitudinal designs in 
the context of variable patterns of attribution could go a long way 
in further specifying the relationships between cognition, gender, 
and depression. 
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SCALE OF ATTRIBUTIONAL STYLE 
DIRECTIONS 
Please try to vividly imagine yourself in the situations that 
follow. If such a situation happened to you, what would you feel 
would have caused it? While events may have many causes, we want 
you to pick only one--the major cause if this event happened to you. 
Please write this cause in the blank provided after each event. 
Next we want you to answer some questions about the cause and a final 
question about the situation. To summarize, we want you to: 
1) Read each situation and vividly imagine it happening to you. 
2) Decide what you feel would be the major cause of this 
situation if it happened to you. 
3) Write one cause in the blank provided. 
4) Answer three questions about the cause. 
5) Answer one question about the situation. 
6) Go on to the next situation. 
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YOU MEET A FRIEND WHO COMPLIMENTS YOU ON YOUR APPEARANCE 
1) Write down the ~ major cause ---------------------------------
2) Is the cause of your friend's compliment due to something about 
you or something about the other person or circumstances? (Circle 
one number) 
Totally due 
to the other 
person or· 
circumstances 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Totally due 
7 to me 
3) In the future when you are with your friends, will this cause 
again influence what happens? (Circle one number) 
Will never 
again influence 1 
what happens 
2 3 4 5 6 
Will always 
7 influence 
what happens 
4) Is the cause something that just affects interacting with friends 
or does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one 
number) 
Influences 
just this 
particular 
situation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Influences 
7 all situa-
tions in my 
life 
5) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Extremely 
7 important 
YOU HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR A JOB UNSUCCESSFULLY FOR SOME TIME 
6) Write down one major cause 
----------------------------------~ 
7) Is the cause of your unsuccessful job search due to something 
about you or something about other people or circumstances? 
(Circle one number) 
Totally due to 
other people 1 
or circumstances 
2 3 4 5 6 
Totally due 
7 to me 
8) In the future when looking for a job, will this cause again 
influence what happens? (Circle one number) 
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Will never 
again influence 1 
what happens 
2 3 4 5 6 
Will always 
7 influence 
what happens 
9) Is the cause something that just influences looking for a job or 
does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one 
number) 
Influences 
just this 
particular 
situation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Influences 
7 all situa-
tions in 
my life 
10) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Extremely 
7 important 
YOU INVEST MONEY IN THE STOCK MARKET AND MAKE A PROFIT 
11) Write down the one cause 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
12) Is the cause of your making a profit in the stock market due to 
something about you or something about other people or circum-
stances? (Circle one number) 
Totally due 
to other people 1 
or circumstances 
2 3 4 5 6 
Totally due 
7 to me 
13) In the future when investing in the stock market, will this cause 
again influence what happens? (Circle one number) 
Will never 
again influence 1 
what happens 
2 3 4 5 6 
Will always 
7 influence 
what happens 
14) Is the cause something that just affects investing in stocks or 
does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one 
number) 
Influences just 
this particular 1 
situation 
2 3 4 5 6 
Influences 
7 all situa-
tions in my 
life 
15) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Extremely 
7 important 
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A FRIEND COMES TO YOU WITH A PROBLEM AND YOU DON'T TRY TO HELP THEM 
16) Write down the ~ major cause ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
17) Is the cause of your not helping your friend due to something 
about you or something about other people or circumstances? 
(Circle one number) 
Totally due 
to other people 1 
or circumstances 
2 3 4 5 6 
Totally due 
7 to me 
18) In the future-when a friend comes to you with a problem, will 
this cause again influence what happens? (Circle one number) 
Will never 
again influence 1 
what happens 
2 3 4 5 6 
Will always 
7 influence 
what happens 
19) Is the cause something that just affects what happens when a 
friend comes to you with a problem or does it also influence 
other areas of your life? (Circle one number) 
Influences just 
this particu- 1 
lar situation 
2 3 4 5 6 
Influences 
7 all situa-
tions in 
my life 
20) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Extremely 
7 important 
YOU GIVE AN IMPORTANT TALK IN FRONT OF A GROUP 
AND THE AUDIENCE REACT NEGATIVELY 
21) Write down the ~ major cause 
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22) Is the cause of the audience reacting negatively due to something 
about you or something about other people or circumstances? 
(Circle one number) 
Totally due to 
other people 1 
or circumstances 
2 3 4 5 6 
Totally due 
7 to me 
23) In the future when giving talks, will this cause again influence 
what happens? (Circle one number) 
Will never 
again influence 1 
what happens 
2 3 4 5 6 
Will always 
7 influence 
what happens 
24) Is this cause something that just influences giving talks or does 
it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number) 
Influences just 
this particular 1 
situation 
2 3 4 5 6 
Influences 
7 all situa-
tions in 
my life 
25) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
YOU DO AN IMPORTANT PROJECT WITH A GROUP 
AND FIND THAT THE PROJECT TURNS OUT WELL 
Extremely 
7 important 
26) Write down the one major cause ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
27) Is the cause of the group working well together due to something 
about you or something about the other people or circumstances? 
(Circle one number) 
Totally due to 
other people 1 
or circumstances 
2 3 4 5 6 
Totally due 
7 to me 
28) In the future when working on a group project, will this cause 
again influence what happens? (Circle one number) 
Will never again 
influence 1 2 3 
what happens 
4 5 6 
Will always 
7 influence 
what happens 
29) Is this cause something that just affects group projects or does 
it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number) 
Influences 
just this 
particular 
situation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Influences 
7 all situa-
tions in 
my life 
30) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Extremely 
7 important 
YOU MEET A FRIEND WHO ACTS HOSTILELY TO YOU 
31) Write down the ~ major cause ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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32) Is the cause of your friend acting hostile due to something about 
you or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle 
one number) 
Totally due 
to other people 1 
or circumstances 
2 3 4 5 6 
Totally due 
7 to me 
33) In the future when interacting with friends, will this cause 
again influence what happens? (Circle one number) 
Will never again 
influence what 1 
happens 
2 3 4 5 6 
Will always 
7 influence 
what happens 
34) Is the cause something that just influences interacting with 
friends or does it also influence other areas of your life? 
(Circle one number) 
Influences just 
this particular 1 
situation 
2 3 4 5 6 
Influences 
7 all situa-
tions in 
my life 
35) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Extremely 
7 important 
YOU CAN'T GET ALL THE WORK DONE THAT OTHERS EXPECT OF YOU 
36) Write down the ~ major cause ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
37) Is the cause of your not getting the work done due to something 
about you or something about the other people or circumstances? 
(Circle one number) 
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Totally due to 
other people 1 
or circumstances 
2 3 4 5 6 
Totally due 
7 to me 
38) In the future when doing the work that others expect, will this 
again influence what happens? (Circle one number) 
Will never again 
influence 1 2 3 
what happens 
4 5 6 
Will always 
7 influence 
what happens 
39) Is the cause something that just affects doing work that others 
expect you to do or does it also influence other areas of your 
life? (Circle one number) 
Influences just 
this particular 1 
situation 
2 3 4 5 6 
Influences 
7 all situa-
tions in 
my life 
40) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Extremely 
7 important 
YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE (BOYFRIEND/GIRLFRIEND) WERE HAVING PROBLEMS 
GETTING ALONG BUT YOU WERE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES 
41) Write down the one major cause ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
42) Is the cause of the problems being resolve due to something about 
you or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle 
one number) 
Totally due to 
other people 1 
or circumstances 
2 3 4 5 6 
Totally due 
7 to me 
43) In the future when trying to resolve problems, will this cause 
again influence what happens? (Circle one number) 
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Will never again 
influence 1 2 3 
what happens 
4 5 6 
Will always 
7 influence 
what happens 
44) Is this cause something that just affects getting along with your 
spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend) or does it also influence other 
areas of your life? (Circle one number) 
Influences just 
this particular 1 
situation 
2 3 4 5 6 
Influences 
7 all situa-
tions in 
my life 
45) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Extremely 
7 important 
YOU APPLY FOR A POSITION THAT YOU WANT VERY BADLY (e.g., IMPORTANT 
JOB, GRADUATE SCHOOL ADMISSION, etc.) AND YOU GET IT 
47) Is the cause of your getting the position due to something about 
you or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle 
one number) 
Totally due to 
other people 
or circumstances 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Totally due 
7 to me 
48) In the future when applying for a position, will this cause again 
influence what happens? (Circle one number) 
Will never again 
influence 1 2 3 
what happens 
4 5 6 
Will always 
7 influence 
what happens 
49) Is the cause something that just influences applying for a posi-
tion or does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle 
one number) 
Influences just 
this particular 1 
situation 
2 3 4 5 6 
Influences 
7 all situa-
tions in 
my life 
50) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
YOU GO OUT ON A DATE AND IT GOES BADLY 
Extremely 
7 important 
51) Write down the ~ major cause ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
52) Is the cause of the date going badly due to something about you 
or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle 
one number) 
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Totally due to 
other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Totally due 
7 to me 
or circumstances 
53) In the future when dating, will this cause again influence what 
happens? (Circle one number) 
Will never again 
influence 1 2 3 
what happens 
4 5 6 
Will always 
7 influence 
what happens 
54) Is the cause something that just influences dating or does it also 
influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number) 
Influences just 
this particular 1 
situation 
2 3 4 5 6 
Influences 
7 all situa-
tions in my 
life 
55) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Extremely 
7 important 
YOU AND THE MEMBERS OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD HAVE BEEN GETTING ALONG WELL 
56) Write down the one major cause ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
57) Is the cause of your household getting along well due to some-
thing about you or something about the other people or circum-
stances? (Circle one number) 
Totally due to 
other people 1 
or circumstances 
2 3 4 5 6 
Totally due 
7 to me 
58) In the future in your household, will this cause again influence 
what happens? (Circle one number) 
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Will never again 
influence 1 2 3 
what happens 
4 5 6 
Will always 
7 influence 
what happens 
59) Is the cause something that just affects how your household gets 
along or does it also influence other areas of your life? 
(Circle one number) 
Influences jus-t 
this particular 1 
situation 
2 3 4 5 6 
Incluences 
7 all situa-
tions in 
my life 
60) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Extremely 
7 important 
SAS2 
ID number: 
1. What grade did you achieve on this test (Circle one letter): 
A B c D F 
Answer the following questions in terms of how you feel at this 
time. That is, your answers do not have to correspond with the 
earlier questionnaire that you took if such answers would not 
accurately reflect how you feel. 
2. How do you evaluate this grade in terms of your own personal 
standards? (Circle one choice) 
Excellent Very Good Good Fair Poor Very Poor 
Terrible 
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3. Write down the one major cause of you performing as you did on this 
test: 
4. Is the cause of your test performance due to something about you 
or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one 
number) 
Totally due to 
other people 1 
or circumstances 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Totally due 
to me 
5. In the future when taking tests, will this cause again influence 
what happens? 
Will never again 
influence 1 2 3 
what happens 
4 5 6 7 
Will always 
influence 
what happens 
6. Is this cause something that just influences academic test per-
formance or does it also influence other areas of your life? 
Influences just Influences all 
this particular 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 situations in 
situation my life 
7. How important to you is your performance on this particular test? 
Not at all Extremely 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 important 
8. How important to you is academic performance in general? 
Not at all 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Extremely 
important 
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9. How much time on this test did you spend thinking and/or wondering 
about how you were doing on the test? 
Very little 
time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very much 
time 
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